This paper examines the effects of firm-level innovation in carbonabatement technologies on optimal cap-and-trade schemes with and without price controls. We characterize optimal cap-and-trade regulation with a price cap and price floor, and compare it to the individual cases of pure taxation and simple emissions cap. Innovation shifts the trade-off between price-and quantity-based instruments towards quantity-based emissions trading schemes. More specifically, an increase in innovation effectiveness lowers the optimal emissions cap, and leads to relaxed price controls unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost curve is small. Because of the decrease in the emissions cap, innovation in abatement technologies can lead to a higher expected carbon price, so as to provide sufficient incentives for private R&D investments. The expected carbon price decreases once innovative technologies are widely used. We characterize optimal cap-and-trade regulation with price cap and price floor, and compare it to the special cases of pure taxation and simple emissions cap. Innovation shifts the tradeoff between price-and quantity-based instruments towards quantity-based emissions trading schemes. More specifically, an increase in innovation effectiveness lowers the optimal emissions cap, and leads to relaxed price controls unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost curve is small.
In order to bound global warming, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that worldwide annual carbon emissions need to be cut approximately in half by 2050 (IPCC 2008) . A mix of different policy instruments is likely to be required to deliver the necessary emissions reductions, including a price for carbon, incentives for technological innovation, and suitable administrative procedures (Stern 2007) . We focus on the role of a carbon price, and explore the role of price-and quantity-control instruments on mitigation efforts and investment in improvement of emissions-abatement technologies. We first characterize optimal cap-and-trade schemes with price controls (of which pure taxation and standard cap-and-trade are special cases) and then examine how a change in innovation effectiveness influences the design of carbon markets. We find that an increase in innovation effectiveness can counter-intuitively lead to higher carbon prices, which stems from the fact that in order to encourage technological innovation, the welfare-maximizing regulator may opt to aggressively decrease the emissions cap, leading to a higher expected carbon price despite the anticipated decrease in abatement cost.
Because of the increased importance of the emissions cap as a policy instrument, more innovation tends to favor quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments such as taxes: unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost curve is small (and an inverse result obtains), an increase in innovation effectiveness will lead to looser price controls (i.e., lower price floor and higher price cap), tipping the scales more towards a quantity-control scheme.
There are three main reasons for a simultaneous consideration of several regulatory instruments. 1 First, a joint optimization of several instruments (prices and quantities) cannot do worse than optimizing any policy instrument individually (Roberts and firms: first, how much carbon (dioxide) to emit ('emissions control'), and, second, how much to invest in an improvement ('innovation') of carbon-abatement technologies.
Emissions Control. Pigouvian taxation (Pigou 1920 ) was initially viewed as the most straightforward way to price the social cost of firms' emissions output, since unlike other distortionary taxation on a firm's inputs, which usually lead to significant deadweight losses (Ballard et al. 1985) , a carbon tax corrects a distortion generated by the lack of a price for the expected environmental damages through carbon (or 'carbon-equivalent ') emissions (Pearce 1991 ). An alternative course of action for governments, namely to issue tradable emissions permits, was suggested already by Coase (1960) and further developed by Crocker (1966) , Dales (1968) , and Montgomery (1972) . Such quantitybased regulation is sometimes viewed as inferior on the grounds of significant transaction costs (Stavins 1995) , given that an administrative system for levying tax is usually available. In the absence of transaction-cost considerations, the optimal choice between tax or quantity-based allowance-trading scheme depends on the nature of the uncertainty (Weitzman 1974): 2 since environmental damages are typically modelled as a convex function of the aggregate emissions output, an increase in risk (Rothchild and Stiglitz 1971 ) increases expected damages (as a consequence of Jensen's inequality), which in turn favors quantitybased regulation. If, on the other hand, the loss in society's payoffs due to uncertainty in emissions output and resulting expected environmental damages are small compared to the loss due to randomness in market prices, then an emissions tax is preferred, as it eliminates price uncertainty. Naturally, as Weitzman (1978) shows, a combination of price and quantity regulation cannot do worse than either policy instrument alone. In Weitzman's treatment a price-quota system determines a socially optimal reward as a function of its emissions output for each participating firm. In actual real-world settings, it is impossible to implement such infinite-dimensional policies (in the form of reward functions) using simple cap-and-trade. Yet, a first approximation, which still combines the features of pure taxation and a simple cap-and-trade system, is a market for emissions allowances with price controls: an emissions cap controls total emissions and determines the initial num- 3 ber of permits to be issued. As long as the resulting market price for emissions is within pre-specified price bounds, this results in a normal cap-and-trade system. If the carbon price reaches the pre-specified maximum price (price cap), additional permits are issued as an endogenous decision variable rather than an exogenous process. With the aid of simulations in a computational general-equilibrium model, Goulder and Mathai (1999) show that a carbon tax may stimulate R&D and technological progress in both carbon-using and carbon-competing industries. Goulder and Mathai (2000) demonstrate analytically that induced technological change leads to a lower carbon tax. Our findings, which are obtained in a somewhat different setting, where firms can fully appropriate rents to innovation, only partially confirm this finding. When the intensity (or 'effectiveness') of 4 innovation is large, then in our model a decrease in tax is an optimal response. Yet, for relatively small induced technological change, which corresponds to fairly realistic model calibration, it may be optimal to increase taxes as a response to an increase in innovation effectiveness. More generally, in a hybrid cap-and-trade scheme with quantity controls, an increase in innovation effectiveness can lead to either a tightening of the price band (for low marginal environmental damages) or a widening of the price band (for high marginal environmental damages). Margolis and Kammen (1999) point out that investments in R&D in the U.S. energy sector are low when compared to other sectors, somewhat corroborating the possibility that innovation effectiveness may still be low for carbon-abatement technologies.
Outline
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the basic model in Section 2, we characterize, in Section 3, optimal regulatory approaches and their respective responses to increases in innovation effectiveness. Policy implications are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a unit mass of firms, indexed by θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R ++ , and distributed on the He shows that a regulator may find it optimal to set taxes above the Pigouvian level of marginal environmental damages in order to provide a sufficiently large incentive to innovate. At time t = 1 (innovation stage), any firm has the option to invest in innovation, which may reduce its cost of carbon abatement in the future. Finally, at time t = 2 (implementation stage), each firm θ ∈ Θ chooses its carbon emissions level.
We now describe each of the three stages in detail, starting with the last.
Implementation Stage (t = 2). Without any price on carbon or other output restrictions, firm θ expects to produce its business-as-usual (BAU) carbon emissions output of e 0 (θ).
The actual BAU carbon emissions for firm θ are subject to a macroeconomic random shockε. The latter is common to all firms and has cdf G : R → [0, 1], with Eε = 0 and 0 < Eε
Given a realized BAU carbon emissions levelê 0 = e 0 (θ) + ε, firm θ's cost of abating its carbon emissions to a level e ≤ê 0 is
whereρ ≥ 1 denotes the outcome of the firm's investment in the preceding innovation stage, further detailed below. All else being equal, the larger the firm's type θ, the smaller its marginal abatement cost (ê 0 − e)/(ρθ).
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Given a price p for each unit of carbon emissions (typically measured in tCO 2 eq, i.e., tons of 'carbon-dioxide equivalent,' and here denoted by tCO 2 for simplicity), the firm's total cost of producing at the emissions 4 In Section 3, these important special cases are examined separately. 5 It is possible to allow for independent firm-specific (idiosyncratic) zero-mean random shocksε(θ) with
for all δ > 0, which complicates the presentation and leads to an equivalent result. By the central limit theorem, the macroeconomic shockε then corresponds to the limiting zero-mean normal distribution with standard deviation σ ε = Θ σ ε (θ)dF (θ). 6 The affine form of the marginal abatement cost is chosen as in Weitzman (1978) 
At this output level, the firm's optimal total carbon emissions cost is
Innovation Stage (t = 1). Given the announcement of a carbon pricing policy, each firm θ chooses the level y of innovative activity. The cost of pursuing the innovative activity K(y) is known, but the outcome of the innovationρ(y) is uncertain. The innovation provides an advantage over the existing technology if and only ifρ(y) > 1. Only in this case will it be utilized. We assume that the expected outcome of innovation for a certain level of innovative activity y is:
Firm θ's expected net payoff from innovating is
Assuming that K(y) is a continuously differentiable, convex, and increasing function (satisfying the Inada conditions K(0) = K (0) = 0 and K (∞) = ∞), the optimal innovation is determined by the first-order optimality condition θp 2 /2 = K (y). If we assume, for the sake of discussion, that
volume (ppmv). CO 2 eq is therefore a time-integrated version of CO 2 e and measures the 'global warming potential' of a given amount of greenhouse gas emissions. 8 In principle it is possible to obtain negative values for optimal carbon emissions, which implies that the firm would further substitute its production away from carbon than its zero-carbon emissions normalization would indicate. Alternatively, the firm can accumulate carbon credits. The unconstrained optimization also simplifies the model in that the expected level of aggregate emissions with macroeconomic uncertainty corresponds to the aggregate emissions level in the absence of this uncertainty ('certainty equivalence'). Relaxing this condition would influence modeling results only marginally, and would also raise the additional question of the precise measurement of the absolute level of BAU emissions. where c is a positive constant, firm θ's optimal innovation becomes
resulting in an expected net payoff of
Thus, the benefits of improving abatement technologies are highly sensitive to the carbon price. Nonetheless, the expected payoff of optimal innovation is positive, as long as small improvements are cheap (since K (0) = 0).
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Regulation Stage (t = 0). The regulator commits to a (deterministic) regulatory policy
consisting of an emissions cap E (implemented by issuing a set quantity of emissions permits), and a price interval [L, U ] for the secondary market in emissions permits. In the event the market price p reaches the price floor L, the regulator offers firms to buy back emissions permits at the price L. If the market price p reaches the price cap U , the regulator offers firms additional permits at the price U .
Remark 1 (i) A pure carbon tax τ can be implemented by choosing
where E ≥ 0 is arbitrary, since the carbon market is bypassed by the regulator, who offers an ex-ante unlimited number of carbon emissions permits at the fixed price of τ .
(ii) A pure carbon emissions cap of E is also a special case, which can be implemented by setting R = (E, 0, ∞), effectively disabling the price controls with L = 0 and U = ∞.
The set of feasible regulatory policies is
To formulate the regulator's problem, we first aggregate the firms' expected emissions at a given carbon price p, which yields (using Eqs. (2)- (4)) the expected aggregate carbon emissions output (2) and (4) in the integrand, the right-hand side of Eq. (6) obtains via straightforward integration. At the aggregate emissions level Q, environmental damages are given by
where d denotes the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost curve.
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The expected environmental damages are thereforē
where the measure of the stochastic pricep is determined by the market-clearing condi-
Insofar as the regulatory policy R influences aggregate emissions, it also controls the level of expected environmental damages. The expected aggregate cost of carbon abatement at the policy R is
where the optimal emissions e * are given in Eq. (2) and optimal innovation is determined by Eq. (4). The firms' expected aggregate social cost of innovationK(R) of the policy R
where the constant λ ∈ [0, 1] describes how much society (i.e., the regulator) cares about these costs. The reason why one would expect generally that λ < 1 is that firms are able to appropriate a portion of the innovation payoffs in the form of intellectual property 11 A quadratic form for environmental damages is widely used in the literature (see, e.g., Baumol and Oates (1988)). Such quadratic damages seem more realistic, especially in light of nonlinear threshold effects for high CO 2 concentrations, than the often assumed linear form (see, e.g., Tol 2005 ). 12 For the measure ofp to be determined by the condition H(p,ε, R) = 0 it is, by the inverse function theorem, enough to assume that ∂H(p, ε, R)/∂p exists and is nonzero almost everywhere.
rights (on top of the abatement-cost savings), resulting in private benefits, e.g., through
international technology licensing or savings in future unmodelled periods, that offset the innovation cost to society at least in part.
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The Regulatory Problem. An optimal regulatory policy R * maximizes expected welfareW (R) (or, equivalently, minimizes total expected social cost SC(R) ≡ −W (R)),
i.e., it is such that
The main notation relevant for the model is summarized in Table 1 .
Optimal Regulation
Common regulatory schemes include pure carbon taxation, cap-and-trade markets without price controls, and cap-and-trade markets with price controls as a generalization which includes the first two. Here we examine all three regulatory schemes. In doing this, we parameterize the firms' 'innovation effectiveness' by β ≥ 0 and examine the effect of innovation as β increases, in particular over the 'base case' without innovation (when β = 0).
Such increases could come about exogenously as a result of government sponsorship, or endogenously through 'learning by doing' with private investment in R&D, which tends to generate further technological possibilities (Grubb 1997 ).
To compute the regulator's objective function (expected total welfareW ), we first determine the price p(ε, R) of carbon using the market-clearing condition (8) as a function of the macroeconomic shock ε and the regulatory policy R = (E, L, U ), which yields
13 In addition, society may be able to obtain a "double dividend" from the revenues generated by the sale of the carbon permits (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Carraro et al. 1996) . For simplicity, we assume that the double dividend is zero. 
is the market price for carbon without innovation, and
ε(E, L) = µL(1 + βL
are the upper and lower thresholds for BAU emissions realizations that trigger price controls. The perturbation term in Eq. (12),
with A = 12µβ
, is nonnegative and increasing in the innovation effectiveness
The innovation effectiveness increases when the innovation cost c decreases, or when the first (µ) or second (σ (11) is obtained by substituting the market price p(ε, R) in Eqs. (7), (9), and (10), leading tō
Pure Taxation
Consider first a restriction of feasible policies to imposing a carbon tax τ ≥ 0, which is equivalent to fixing a price in a carbon market by setting L = U = τ and issuing an arbitrary number of permits, e.g., E = e 0 . In that case, R = (e 0 , τ, τ ) and p(ε, R) ≡ τ . 
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(ii) The optimal tax τ *
.
(iii) For β → ∞, the optimal tax vanishes, i.e., it is τ * (∞) = 0.
Part (i) implies that the optimal social welfare without innovation is
The maximum tax τ * max = max β≥0 τ * (β) follows directly from part (ii) when the inequality is either replaced by an equality or satisfied everywhere (in which case τ * 0 is maximal), so that
it is imposed where
. The fact that the optimal carbon tax is (as long as λ < 1) generally nonmonotonic in innovation effectiveness, as shown in Figure 1 , is noteworthy. Indeed, if environmental damages are 'small,' so that µd < 1 − λ, then it is optimal for a regulator to first increase taxes as innovation starts to become feasible (i.e., for small β). The intuition is that higher taxes lead to increased incentives to innovate and thus imply more ambitious emissions targets. The regulator is more likely to increase taxes as a response to increases in β, the larger 1/µ (corresponding, roughly, to the average marginal abatement cost) and the larger the weight on the firms' aggregate profits in the expected social welfare. As innovation becomes more and more effective, the regulator can decrease taxes, since firms will tend to fully abate their emissions, even when the carbon tax is low. If the regulator considers all of the innovation cost as social cost, so that λ = 1, the optimal tax is decreasing in the innovation effectiveness β. 
Basic Cap-and-Trade (without Price Controls)
We now consider the special case where the regulator chooses a "basic" cap-and-trade scheme without binding price bounds, by setting L = 0 and U = ∞. Then the market price for carbon depends only on the emissions cap E and the realization of the macroeconomic uncertainty ε, i.e., p = p(ε, E) = p 0 (ε, E) − ∆(p 0 (ε, E), β). It is determined by the market-clearing condition (8) , which can be written in the form
Proposition 2 (Optimal Emissions Cap) For any β ≥ 0, let E * (β) be the optimal emissions cap in the absence of price controls.
(i) In the absence of innovation, i.e., when β = 0, the optimal emissions cap is
(
ii) As the firms' innovation effectiveness β increases, the optimal emissions cap E * (β)
decreases.
(iii) For β → ∞, the optimal emissions cap vanishes, i.e., E * (∞) = 0.
In the absence of innovation, Eq. (13) and part (i) of Propositon 1 imply that the expected price is the same as the optimal tax without innovation computed in the previous section,
The corresponding optimal expected social welfare is
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 characterizes the behavior of the solution in β.
Since this paper provides several such monotone comparative statics results, we provide the proof intuition.
The proofs of other such results (cf. Proposition 1 (ii) and Proposition 4 (ii),(iii)) follow along similar lines. Via implicit differentiation of the market-clearing condition (21),
we obtain that p E , p β < 0 < p βE (see Eqs. (24)- (26) in the Appendix for the exact expressions), where subscripts denote partial derivatives. That is, when the carbon market clears, the market price p decreases in the emissions cap E and innovation effectiveness β;
it also exhibits increasing differences in (β, E), which means that the price decrease in E (resp. β) is moderated when β (resp. E) increases. Furthermore, since p is nonnegative and decreasing in both β and E, any (positive integer) power of p also has increasing differences in (β, E). Using the previous relations, expected abatement costC can easily be shown to have increasing differences in (β, E), whileD does not depend on β for a given emissions cap. Thus, the expected social welfareW has decreasing differences in (β, E), so that the optimal E is decreasing in β. In other words, as innovation becomes easier (β increases), it is optimal to impose a more ambitious emissions cap, i.e., E *
is decreasing in β (cf. Figure 2) . 
Comparison between Pure Taxation and Basic Cap-and-Trade
The price fluctuations have a detrimental impact on social welfare compared to pure taxation if environmental damages are small, i.e., when µd < 1. Indeed, as shown by Weitzman (1974) , the difference in optimal expected welfare levels, With increasing innovation effectiveness abatement goes up and aggregate emissions tend to zero under either of the two regulatory schemes. The intuition for part (i) of Proposition 3 is that while expected social welfare is increasing under both regulatory policies, the increase is slower under pure taxation. With innovation firms perceive price uncertainty as positive, as the upside to a higher price is a disproportionately larger benefit from abating carbon and thus a higher expected return on innovation (the technical reason being that firms' payoffs are convex in the market price, which implies a preference for increases in risk). In the extreme, a fixed carbon tax does not respond to the macroeconomic uncertainty, which leads to residual emissions (or overabatement) and therefore to positive environmental damages, whereas quantity-regulation forces aggregate emissions to zero. Similarly, the relation between price and aggregate emissions output in Eq. (6) yields that
In other words, finding the optimal tax is equivalent to finding an emissions cap that maximizes the expected welfare subject to market clearing (21) , and finding the optimal emissions cap is the same as optimizing the expected welfare subject to the output relation (6). (18) and (19) reduces expected aggregate costs, but at the same time tends to increase expected aggregate damages. The introduction of price ceilings therefore tends to convert abatement-cost uncertainty into environmental-damage uncertainty. As a result it may be optimal to increase or decrease the emissions cap, depending on how fast marginal environmental damages increase. A price floor, on the other hand, tends to increase the expected aggregate abatement cost and decrease expected aggregate damages, and therefore produces a counterveiling effect on the optimal emissions cap.
Price Aggregate Emissions

Macroeconomic Uncertainty
Proposition 4 (Optimal Cap-and-Trade with Price Controls) (i) In the absence of innovation, i.e., when β = 0, the optimal regulatory policy R
where the optimal uncertainty thresholdsε *
are given by Eqs. (14) and (15), respectively. For parts (ii) and (iii), assume that the density of the macroeconomic uncertaintyε is nondecreasing on its support. For β = 0 (i.e., without innovation), the optimal emissions cap E * 0 is unaffected by the optimal price controls and identical to the one determined earlier, in Section 3.2. The price controls are symmetric to the marginal environmental damages dE * 0 if the distribution of macroeconomic uncertainty is symmetrical. The width of the interval depends on thickness of the tails of that distribution and on magnitude of the product µd. The latter is also decisive in determining the tradeoff between pure taxation (µd < 1) and quantitybased regulation (µd > 1), as analyzed before. With increases in µd, not only does the regulator set a lower emissions cap, but also price controls are loosened around dE * 0 . Part (ii) of the last result states, that, all else being equal, innovation always leads to a more ambitious emissions target. In part (iii) of Proposition 4, it becomes evident that the evolution of the price controls as a function of innovation effectiveness is somewhat more complicated. First, the price cap and price always adjust to changes of β in opposite directions, either tightening or widening the interval of admissible prices in the market for carbon permits. Second, for small d price controls tighten with increasing β, i.e., increases. Combining the last two points, we see that the sensitivity of the optimal regulatory scheme to the magnitude of the slope of marginal environmental damages d increases with increasing β (cf. Figure 4) . This makes sense and directly corresponds to the classical tradeoff by Weitzman. But this time it is related to the regulatory response to innovation. Depending on the magnitude of the environmental damages, an increase of innovation effectiveness may prompt a regulator to impose more or less price control, a decision which becomes more sensitive to the magnitude of marginal environmental damages.
Remark 3 Even for extremely large damage cost, the corresponding limits for the price bounds are well-defined,
Example 3 If the macroeconomic random shockε is uniformly distributed on [−δ, δ] for some δ > 0, then in the absence of innovation the optimal carbon emissions cap is
while the optimal price controls are 
Comparative Statics Analysis
The proof of the last parts of Proposition 4 sheds further light on how the optimal regulatory scheme adjusts as some of its components are adjusted. In other words, the questions we would like to answer now are of the sort, 'what happens to the optimal price floor and the optimal emissions cap when the price ceiling is changed?' The latter adjustment may be needed for political reasons or for harmonizing between different cap-and-trade schemes in neighboring countries, despite the prima facie welfare losses in a single country.
As pointed out by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , based on earlier findings by Topkis (1968), among others, the monotonicity of optimal decisions (on lattices) critically depends on the supermodularity properties of the objective function in the decision variables and parameters. 
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A substantial private investment is needed to significantly reduce carbon emissions into the atmosphere. Effective regulatory schemes therefore need to take into account not only the firms' emissions decisions, but also the return on their R&D investments. A price floor guarantees a minimum return on innovation, whereas a price cap reduces the volatility in the aggregate abatement cost. The last section has shown that changes in the firms' propensity to innovate are likely to have a profound impact on the optimal design of carbon taxes as well as cap-and-trade markets, with or without price controls. It has also made clear that a higher innovation effectiveness tends to increase the attractiveness of cap-and-trade schemes vs. carbon taxes.
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This is due to the fact that when prices increase, the substitution of emissions uncertainty for price uncertainty by imposing a tighter quantity control serves as an additional innovation incentive, while when prices decrease, the savings in abatement cost become so large that the regulator's only worry is the uncertainty in environmental damages, thus calling for quantity control.
The introduction of price controls in cap-and-trade markets, while superior to basic cap-and-trade from a purely mathematical point of view, is subject to a number of political considerations. First, the determination of a price cap in a political process is likely to lead to substantial influence activities by affected parties during the course of the legislative process, which may therefore produce price caps that are too low or price floors that are too high in the form of 'political compromises.' Second, environmental damages depend on aggregate carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions irrespective of their origin. This implies the need for a coordinated response and therefore government intervention, and international cooperation. A negative side-effect of price controls may be that they create challenges for the harmonization of cap-and-trade schemes with different price controls, and may even lead to arbitrage opportunities in cross-border trade of emissions permits.
Given the above caveats, what are the potential benefits of additional price controls? 18 17 Both taxes and cap-and-trade markets implement a price for carbon emissions, encouraging firms to switch to low-carbon technologies and to develop better carbon-abatement technologies. They also both raise funds (directly in the case of a carbon tax, indirectly using an emissions permit system) which can be used to mitigate environmental damages or to help other countries achieve common emissions-control targets.
18 Indirect methods of 'price stabilization,' for example through the use of buffer stocks, were suggested in great detail by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) . In this spirit, it may be possible to relax direct price controls if one allows for emissions banking to create buffers moderating price fluctuations that would
Price caps reduce expected aggregate costs as well as the social cost of innovation, as can be seen directly from Eqs. (18) and (20) . At the same time they tend to increase the expected environmental damages. Decreasing an existing price cap decreases the optimal emissions cap, as long as d is small. For large d, the opposite holds true. Thus, the degree to which a more ambitious policy can be pursued by introducing a price cap depends on the relative magnitude of the environmental damage cost. Price floors, on the other hand, offer a government-backed minimum value for emissions permits. This encourages innovation. Price floors also tend to reduce carbon-price volatility, thus increasing the emissions volatility and therefore the expected environmental damage, all else being equal.
However, because of the higher innovation, it is to be expected that firms abate more carbon than before, compensating for the increased in the environmental damages due to the emissions-volatility increase.
Conclusion
In the absence of innovation, the classical Weitzman (1974) We assume that firms can invest in innovation, and thus reduce the cost of mitigation efforts. This enables them to mitigate more carbon at the same price of carbon. With additional mitigation opportunities the marginal abatement cost is reduced. This shifts the tradeoff between marginal abatement cost and marginal environmental damage cost.
The optimal emissions cap decreases in the innovation effectiveness. In the presence of innovation we observe two additional results. First, carbon prices create incentives for inotherwise result from the shocks in BAU emissions levels driven by macroeconomic uncertainty. A multiperiod emissions-trading framework is needed to address this question.
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novation in mitigation technologies. A welfare-optimal carbon policy targets an emissions level at which the innovation-enhanced marginal mitigation cost curve (considering expected innovation) intersects the damage cost curve that includes the additional benefits from incentives for innovation. As a result, the carbon price in a world with innovation can be higher than in a world without innovation. Second, the model shows that with increasing innovation, price controls are tightened when marginal environmental damage costs are low, and relaxed when these costs are large. Innovation creates mitigation opportunities that reduce the slope of the mitigation cost curve and therefore make the optimal instrument look more like a cap (e.g. wider spreads).
In the current discussion on price caps and floors, the analysis focuses often on static models. Including additional dimensions can materially alter the results. optimal levels τ * (β) and E * (β), an application of the envelope theorem yields that
key difference of pure taxation is that as innovation effectiveness goes to infinity, the (deterministic!) optimal tax level approaches zero, and at the same time the aggregate abatement approaches e 0 , so that, using Eqs. (6) and (17) where p β is given in Eq. (25) . Using Eqs. (24)- (26), we therefore find that (1 + 4βL
2 )G (ε) 1 + 3βL 2 .
Since, by hypothesis, the macroeconomic uncertainty is nondecreasing on its support, it is G (ε) ≤ G (ε). Furthermore, it is easy to show that the function µx 
